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THE ALLEN INSTRUCTION
IN CRIMINAL CASES:
IS THE DYNAMITE CHARGE ABOUT
TO BE PERMANENTLY DEFUSED?*
PAUL MARCUS**
THE PROBLEM

Let us begin with a none too hypothetical trial situation. The defendant is charged with murder, and after twelve full days of hearing evidence, the jury is finally instructed and directed to consider a verdict. 1
The jurors deliberate and they deliberate still further. They ask for certain portions of the testimony to be read to them and they retire to the
jury room once again. Still, after a full day with the case they cannot
agree. They go home and come back fresh the next morning to begin
anew. Still they reach no verdict. A third day of discussion comes and no
verdict is yet before the trial judge. Indeed, the only communication
from the jurors is a statement by the jury foreman to the effect that the
jury is having a difficult time reaching a verdict and it might be deadlocked.
At this time, should the judge do nothing and simply hope that the
jury will soon reach a verdict? Or, should the court, on the other hand,
take some more direct action in the hope of getting the jurors to agree
to a verdict? Certainly the situation poses a dilemma for the trial judge,
yet it is one which has existed for centuries. Indeed some scholars trace

* © 1978 by Paul Marcus
* * Associate Professor of Law,

University of Illinois. A.B. 1968, J.D. 1971,
University of California Los Angeles.
1. The fact situation here is taken from People v. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d. 835,
566 P.2d 997, 139 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1977). See discussion accompanying notes
29-35 infra.
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it as far back as fourteenth century England. 2 In the early days direct
and forceful action was the guiding light. Load the jurors onto oxcarts
and have them bounce around until a verdict was reached, 3 or perhaps
keep the jurors without food or drink until a verdict came forth. 4 Such
drastic steps soon became unpopular, yet direct action was still taken by
trial judges. Some ordered that food rations to deadlocked jurors be cut
back 5 or that the jurors be forced to pay for their own food. 6 Other
judges preferred somewhat different methods such as not providing
heat to the jury room during the middle of winter, 7 or simply requiring
the jury to deliberate all night without offering the jurors the option of
getting some sleep. 8 One trial judge took perhaps the most direct action
of all; he informed the jurors that if he found any juror to have "stubbornly refused to do his duty" he would send that juror to jail for contempt of court. 9
These actions by trial judges clearly produced results, normally a quick
conference by the jurors and a guilty verdict. Yet, even in the early part
of the nineteenth century some judges, particularly appeals judges,
found such practices too forceful and attempts were made to take less
stringent action which would lead to jury verdicts. 10 What developed
from this troubled history was the supplemental instruction, the direction to the deadlocked jury to reconsider and perhaps come up with a
unanimous verdict. The earliest attempt at such an instruction, relied on
heavily by the United States Supreme Court, was used by a Massachusetts trial judge and reviewed by the Massachusetts Supreme Court
2. G. CRABB, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw; OR AN ATTEMPT TO TRACE THE
RisE, PROGREss, AND SuccESSIVE CHANGES oF THE CoMMON LAw; FROM THE EAR·
LIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME 287 (1829). For a general discussion of the
historical dimension of this problem, see Comment, Instructing Deadlocked juries in
Light of the Trial of Juan Corona, 53 ORE. L. REv. 213 (1974); Comment, Instructing the Deadlocked Jury: Some Practical Considerations, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PRoc.
169 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Practical Considerations].
3. State v. Jeffors, 64 Mo. 376, 381 (187'7).
4. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES * 375; Pope & Jacobs v. State, 36 Miss.
121 (1858).
5. Fairbanks, Morse, & Co. v. Weeber, 15 Colo. App. 268, 62 P. 368 (1900).
6. Henderson v. Reynolds, 84 Ga. 159, 10 S.E. 734 (1889).
7. Mead v. City of Richland Center, 237 Wis. 537, 297 N.W. 419 (1941).
8. Commonwealth v. Moore, 398 Pa. 198, 157 A.2d 65 (1959). Justice Musmanno filed a vigorous dissent. Nevertheless, the conviction for voluntary manslaughter was affirmed, despite the action of the trial court.
9. Liveley v. Sexton, 35 Ill. App. 417 (1890).
10. Such techniques are not relegated to a place in ancient history as very
vigorous efforts have been utilized by trial judges even in recent years. See, e.g.,
United States v. Parks, 411 F.2d 1171, 1173 (1st Cir. 1969), where the jury deliberated from one in the afternoon until one in the morning. The jurors informed
the judge that they were tired and were deadlocked yet the judge did not allow
them to go home. Predictably, a guilty verdict was returned less than two hours
later.
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in the case of Commonwealth v. Tuey. 11 The instruction was reviewed
favorably by the higher court and soon began to spread throughout the
nation. Why was it so popular? There are two reasons for its rapid popularity as well as for the United States Supreme Court's quick validation
of the supplemental instruction. First, it was not as harsh as earlier
methods. Second, and more importantly, it worked. Deadlocked juries,
after hearing the instruction, returned verdicts. 12 It worked so well, in
fact, that lawyers began to describe it-probably accurately-as the
"third-degree instruction," 13 the "shotgun instruction," 14 the "nitroglycerin charge," 15 the "dynamite charge," 16 the "hammer instruction," 17 and finally, the "hanging instruction." 18 Of course, its most
popular name is, simply, the Allen instruction.
THE ALLEN INSTRUCTION

While there is no single or uniform supplemental jury instruction to
deal with the problem of the deadlocked jury 19 in criminal cases, 20 most
such instructions trace their roots, at least, back to the famous 1896 Supreme Court decision in Allen v. United States. 21 The decision is an odd
one, odd certainly in the fact that Allen was not represented by counsel
and no brief was presented on his behalf, and odd also in the fact that
for such a major trial dilemma 22 so little consideration was given to the
issue by the Court. 23 Of the eighteen assigned errors in the case, the
11. 62 Mass. 1 (1851).
12. "The charge is used precisely because it works, because it can blast ·a
verdict out of a jury otherwise unable to agree that a person is guilty." United
States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 652, 666 (5th Cir. 1972). But see Comment, Practical
Cons_iderations, supra note 2, at 185.
13. Comment, ABA jury Instructions Adopted as Preferable to Allen Charge, 25
VAND. L. REv. 246 n.2 (1972).
14. Id.
15. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY jURY 151 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
16. People v. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d 835, 836, 566 P.2d 997, 1000, 139 Cal. Rptr.
861, 864 (1977).
17. State v. Cook, 512 S.W.2d 907 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
18. Levine v. Headlee, 148 W.Va. 323, 134 S.E.2d 892 (1964).
19. "There is not merely one Allen charge, but an infinite number of variations of the charge, in current use." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 15, at 155.
20. Because of the different considerations present in civil actions, only the
criminal trial problem will be addressed here. No doubt, however, the problem is
present in civil cases as well. See People v. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d 835, 566 P.2d 997,
139 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1977).
21. 164 u.s. 492 (1896).
22. Cf Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 741 (5th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966) (Coleman,]., specially concurring).
23. The case had twice been before the Court previously because of erroneous instructions. 150 U.S. 551 (1893) and 157 U.S. 675 (1895). The third time
around the supplemental instruction discussion took barely one page of space.
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last two raised the problem for discussion here. As the Supreme Court
indicated, after the jury began its deliberations it came back into the
court room and received additional instructions. The Court paraphrased
the instructions as follows:
These instructions were quite lengthy and were, in substance,
that in a large proportion of cases absolpte certainty could not
be expected; that although the verdict must be the verdict of
each individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should examine the question
submitted with candor and· with a proper regard and deference
to the opinions of each other; that is was their duty to decide
the case if they could conscientiously do so; that they should
listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's arguments; that, if much the larger number were for conviction, a
dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt was a
reasonable one which made no impression upon the minds of
so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself.
If, upon the other hand, the majority was for acquittal, the
minority ought to ask themselves whether they might not
reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not
concurred in by the majority. 24
While it could be argued that such an instruction was unduly coercive,
particularly in its direction only to dissenting jurors, 25 the Court took
little time before strongly supporting the instruction.
While, undoubtedly, the verdict of the jury should represent
the opinion of each individual juror, it by no means follows that
opinions may not be changed by conference in the jury room.
The very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a
comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors
themselves. It certainly cannot be the law that each juror should
not listen with deference to the arguments and with a distrust
of his own judgment, if he finds a large majority of the jury
taking a different view of the case from what he does himself.
It cannot be that each juror should go to the jury room with a
blind determination that the verdict shall represent his opinion
of the case at that moment; or, that he should close his ears to
the arguments of men who are equally honest and intelligent as
himself. 26
Considering the broad problems with deadlocked juries and the need for
a uniform strategy for dealing with the problems, the Court's virtually
summary affirmance of the instruction is surprising. Not nearly as surprising, however, as the Court's refusal to consider ever again the merits

24. 164 U.S. at 501. The Court said that the instruction was taken from
Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. 1 (1851).
25. See text accompanying notes 70-83, infra.
26. 164 U.S. at 501.
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of the instruction. 27 The Fifth Circuit noted this well. "That it should
have become the foundationstone of all modern law regarding deadlocked juries is perhaps the greatest anomaly of the Allen case." 28
But Allen did swiftly capture the hearts and minds of trial judges
across the country and an Allen, or Allen-type, instruction began to be
used in most jurisdictions as a matter of course. This state of affairs
proceeded apace for approximately half a century. Then, beginning in
the early 1950's, criticism of the Allen charge surfaced and became increasingly palatable to appellate judges. As we shall see, several states
and federal circuits have expressly rejected Allen. At this juncture,
though, it would be well to look at the attacks on Allen, and there have
been none as direct and well-considered as that by the California Supreme Court in the latter part of 1977.
CRITICS OF THE DYNAMITE CHARGE

Making reference to an "Allen instruction" or "Allen-type instruction" is
a risky proposition. 29 Many trial judges begin with the basic formulation as presented in Allen but move on to give the jury further statements. Such a situation confronted the California court in People v.
Gainer. 30 The trial court there gave the "basic" Allen instruction to the
jury after the jury reported it was deadlocked. In addition to this basic
instruction, however, the jury was informed that "the case must at some
time be decided" and that "there is no reason to suppose the case will
ever be submitted to twelve men or women more intelligent, more impartial or more competent to decide it.... " 31 The court, thus, was
called upon to evaluate the traditional, basic Allen charge as well as the
embellishments added by the trial court in the actual case.
"Collateral" Attacks on the Instruction

Before exploring the two major arguments which the Gainer court
utilized in striking down the Allen charge and the modified instruction, it
should be noted that far more than two arguments have been used for
decades in questioning the propriety of such a supplemental instruction.
Preliminarily, the fact that there is no single Allen instruction 32 itself
serves as an important argument against the rule. 33 The language dif27. See text accompanying notes 124-31, infra.
28. United States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 652, 666 (5th Cir. 1972).
29. See note 19, supra.
30. 19 Cal.3d 835, 566 P.2d 997, 139 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1977).
31. Id. at 841, 566 P.2d at 999, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
32. "Second, the Allen charge has resulted in a multitude of variations which
have in turn bred and proliferated appellate review." State v. Martin, 297 Minn.
359, 365, 211 N.W.2d 765, 769 (1973).
33. "Each new paraphrase of the charge brings up its own questions of propriety, and courts have differed widely in their tolerance for added or substi-
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fers from case to case, and the reliance on any one particular element is
fleeting at best. In banning the use of such supplemental instructions,
the Arizona Supreme Court perhaps stated the complaint best:
It now appears that its continued use will result in an endless
chain of designs, each link thereof tempered and forged with
varying facts and circumstances and welded with the everchanging personalities of the appellate court. This is not in
keeping with sound justice.... We are convinced that the evils
far outweigh the benefits, and decree that its use shall no
longer be tolerated and approved by this court. 34
Moreover, the attempt to use different language to assuage the critics of
Allen has sometimes led to almost comical results. Consider the statement
of the Louisiana Supreme Court:
In the course of giving its instruction, the trial court admonished the jurors that if a majority favor conviction, the
minority should consider whether their doubts are reasonable,
since they make no effective impression upon the minds of
"* * * so many equally honest~ equally intelligent fellow jurors.
* * *" Likewise, the court instructed that if a majority or a lesser
number favor acquittal, the other jurors should ask themselves
whether they do not have reason to doubt the correctness of a
judgment not concurred in "* * * by many of their fellow
jurors.* * *" (Emphasis here and elsewhere supplied.) ....
[S]uch a charge virtually insures jury confusion; it urges those
favoring conviction or acquittal to discount their views if they
are in the minority or in a bare majority. Thus, the instruction is
clearly an attempt to avoid the coercive effect of admonition of
only the minority and to achieve a balanced charge. Such a
charge is so difficult to comprehend that ... it is "* * * an invitation to a frolic with Alice in Wonderland." 35
Many other problems have arisen in connection with the use of a supplemental instruction generally. For instance, as discussed in Gainer,
there is the problem of defense objections to the Allen instruction. In
many situations the defense counsel may be unable to object prior to the
giving of the instruction; has he waived his claim by such inactivity? The
Gainer court said no. 36 There is also the continuing question of the

tuted language." Comment, Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite: A Critical Looll at the
"Allen Charge," 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 386, 391 (1964).
34. State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161, 166, 342 P.2d 197, 200 (1959). See generally Comment, Criminal Procedure-Jury Instructions-ABA Standard Adopted for Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 42 TENN. L. REv. 803 (1975).
35. State v. Nicholson, 315 So.2d 639, 642 (La. 1975).
36. Clearly defendants cannot be required to anticipate supplemental
instructions a judge might give, upon pain of inviting error. Nor
was the defense counsel required to interrupt the judge's charge at
every controversial phrase, thereby courting the animosity of the
jury and implying that the charge hurt his client's case. Indeed
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judge gtvmg the supplemental instruction after he has found out the
numerical division of the deadlocked jury. While it is well established
that the judge may not make inquiry of the jury to find out the division
of its members after an apparent deadlock, 37 in many cases such information is volunteered by the jury. Is it error then to give the supplemental instruction? Some judges say no, so long as the information was in
fact voluntarily given. 38 Others, such as Judge Sobeloff, take a different
view. He has argued that such a practice is error, as "the implications of
Brasfield would seem to apply equally whether the information was promoted by the judge's inquiry or was thrust upon him. The pressure on
the minority jurors is the same in both instances." 39 This reasoning was
adopted by then Judge Warren Burger in Mullin v. United States. 40 The
trial court there had declared a mistrial after the jury informed the
court that it was deadlocked and further informed the court that the
split was seven guilty, four not guilty and one undecided. The Chief
Justice agreed that the declaration of mistrial was proper because "[i]t
would have been a precarious undertaking for the Judge to give a supplemental charge to consider each other's views when he was already
advised that only 4 of I2 jurors voted for acquittal." 41
Quite apart from the general propriety of giving the instruction after
receiving the information concerning division, there is the question of
the judge doing so once he hears there are very few minority jurors.
Although allowing continued use of the Allen charge in other circumstances, one court did reverse a conviction in which the supplemen-.
tal instruction was given after the trial judge inadvertantly learned that
the jury stood II to I for conviction, 42 while another court in the same
situation affirmed a conviction. 43 Perhaps the answer is to instruct the
jury very early in the trial never to reveal how its votes are progressing.
This was the remedy suggested by the Chief Justice in Mullin:
While it is probably rare for jurors to reveal the standing of
their vote to anyone before verdict or deadlock is found we
commend to the District Court a fixed practice of admonishing
every jury at the time it retires that it must not reveal the standcommon courtesy, and respect for the dignity of judicial proceedings, caution against interruption of a judge who is advising the
jury.
19 Cal.3d at 842 n.2, 566 P.2d at 1000 n.2, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 864 n.2.
37. Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448 (1926).
38. United States v. Williams, 444 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1970).
39. United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1348 (dissenting opinion).
40. 356 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
41. Id. at 370.
42. People v. Baumgartner, 166 Cal. App.2d 103, 332 P.2d 366 (1958). See
discussion in People v. Gainer, 19 Cal.3d at 845, 566 P.2d at 1002, 139 Cal. Rptr.
at 866.
43. United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1977).
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ing of its vote at any time to anyone, including the Trial Judge,
but to report only a verdict or inability to reach one. 44
A more recent problem has now surfaced to make life even more difficult for appeals judges, the giving of the supplemental instruction
more than once. Some courts have allowed the giving of the instruction
more than once when the jury requested it. 45 In United States v. Seawell46 the far more difficult question was put at issue. After deliberating
for some hours in connection with an apparently difficult armed robbery
case, the jury informed the judge that it was "at a ten-to-two impasse." 47
The judge gave the supplemental instruction and the jury retired again.
Three and one-half hours later the jury again informed the judge of the
impasse. The judge reread the instruction and less than one hour later a
guilty verdict was returned. While continuing to uphold Allen, 48 the
court concluded that the circumstances here dictated reversal.
Ordinarily, the general test of whether a supplemental jury
instruction is in error is to consider all the circumstances to determine if the instruction was coercive. Pragmatic considerations weigh against the application of this test when an Allen
charge is given more than once. A case-by-case determination
would provide little, if any, guidance for a trial judge. Defendants would also face insurmountable difficulties in attempting
to show prejudice. A single Allen charge, without more, stands
at the brink of impermissible coercion. We believe that the protection of a defendant's right to an impartial jury compels a per
se. rule. Such a rule is not at odds with prior decisions of this
court or other courts of appeals. We conclude that as a sound
rule of practice it is reversible error to repeat an Allen charge in
a federal prosecution in this circuit after a jury has reported
itself deadlocked and has not itself requested a repetition of the
instruction. 49

44. 356 F.2d at 370.
45. White v. United States, 279 F.2d 740, 750 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
850 (1960).
46. 550 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1977).
47. Id. at 1160.
48. Problems arising from the inherently coercive effect of the Allen
charge have caused other courts of appeals and state courts to prohibit or to restrict severely its use. Nevertheless, the content, timing
and circumstances surrounding the Allen charges given here have
been upheld by this circuit and we do not undertake to reexamine
those decisions.
Id. at 1162.
49. Id. at 1163. The court went on to note, in footnote 8:
A per se rule, such as the one we have adopted here, always poses
the risk that it may sweep within its embrace cases which do not
warrant its protection. We believe, however, that this "cost" of
adopting a per se rule is outweighed by the importance of a defendant's right to an impartial jury trial and the insurmountable prob-
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The timing of the Allen charge raises a related and complex question:
Before the judge can give the instruction does the jury have to inform
him that it is "hopelessly deadlocked"? The usual rule is no, it is in the
trial judge's discretion as to the timing. 5° Still, faced with an uncertain
situation some courts are willing to focus on both the time element and
the nature of the communications from the jury. See, for instance,
United States v. Contreras, 51 where the trial judge gave the instruction on
the jury's second day of deliberations, but before there was any indication that the jury was deadlocked. The court reversed the conviction
finding that the instruction had a coercive impact on the jury.
Within the circumstances of this case, the Allen charge was
premature. We have a profound feeling that it was coercive
upon the jury. The Allen instruction "certainly should be given
only when it is apparent to the district judge from the jury's
conduct or the length of its deliberations that it is clearly warranted." Here, although the jury had deliberated for nearly
eight hours, there was no indication that it was deadlocked. In
seeking clarification of the judge's instructions, the jury did not
indicate that it was having trouble reaching a unanimous verdict.52
In connection with the timing of the instruction, two additional points
should be made. First, regardless of the rule in any single case, "there is
no uniformity among courts as to the length of time which must elapse
after the jury retires before the charge is appropriate." 53 Of more concern is the second point, as expressed in 1962 by Judge Brown in voting
to invalidate the Allen charge.
What is worse, it is becoming more and more commonplace.
Nearly every hard-fought criminal case coming to this Court
reveals the Judge s9oner or later giving this charge or some
embellishment of it. Too often, as in these two cases, it was but
a matter of a few hours after the jury had retired to deliberate.
And not infrequently, as we were led to believe on oral argument in both of these cases, it occurs with the last jury in the
last case at that Division point for that particular term. To the
other pressures which are irrelevant is the other and natural
one of a personal consideration for the Judge who, like jurors,
also wants to go home. The charge pointedly reminds them
that to hold out disrupts the plans of all. 54
lems of proof and appellate review that a less definite rule would
occasion.
Compare with United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1977).
50. People v. Newby, 66 Mich. App. 400, 239 N.W.2d 387 (1976).
51. 463 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1972).
52. Id. at 774.
53. State v. Martin, 297 Minn. 359, 366, 211 N.W.2d 765, 769 (1973).
54. Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962). ABA STANDARDS, supra note 15, at 147-48.
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The final collateral question relates to the practical value in having an
Allen or Allen-type supplemental instruction. Considering the relatively
small number of cases which ever progress to the felony jury trial deadlock, 55 and the seriousness that most jurors attach to their assignments, 56 substantial doubt must be raised as to the real need for the
supplemental instruction. Moreover, even assuming that there are some
true savings at the trial level in time and cost with the supplemental
instruction, doubtless those savings are more than balanced by the costs
at the appeals level. Numerous courts and commentators have lamented
the time and energy spent by appeals courts on the Allen instruction
generally-along with timing problems, harmless error questions :; 7 and
other issues-and some have even concluded that "any judicial expense
saved at the trial level is resurrected at the appellate level." 58 To be
sure. when the Arizona Supreme Court finally had enough of the
numerous Allen issue appeals one of the main reasons cited for the invalidation of the instruction was the time and effort wasted because of it.
This instruction has been before us four times. When and
wherever its use is called into question it must stand or fall
upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. It has
given, and we believe each use will give us, harassment and distress in the administration of justice. No rule of thumb can circumscribe definite bounds of when and where, or under what
circumstances it should be given or refused.
It now appears that its continued use will result in an endless
chain of decisions, each link thereof tempered and forged with
varying facts and circumstances and welded with everchanging
personalities of the appellate court. This is not in keeping with
sound justice and the preservation of human liberties and sec-

Other time limit problems have been created as well. See, e.g., Goff v. United
States, 446 F.2d 623 (lOth Cir. 1971), where thejudge informed the jury that he
would give them one more hour of deliberation or he would declare a mistrial.
The court on appeal held this to be error. "It was impermissibly suggestive and
coercive for the Court to place a time fuse on the period of deliberation. Such
constitutes reversible error." !d. at 626.
55. See Comment, Practical Considerations, supra note 2, at 170.
56. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 15, at 151-52:
While some say that the Allen charge is only intended to induce jurors
to join in conscientious collective deliberation in an honest effort to
reach a verdict, there is not evidence that any significant number of
American jurors fail to approach their task in this manner (citations
omitted). Indeed, what evidence is available on why juries fail to agree
indicates that it is not the result of one or two stubborn jurors, but
rather the result of a truly substantial division on the first ballot.
57. See People v. Gainer, 19 Cal.3d at 854, 566 P.2d at 1007, 139 Cal. Rptr.
at 871.
58. Comment, ABA Jury Instructions Adopted as Preferable to Allen Charge, 25
VAND. L. REv. 246, 251 (1972). See also Comment, An Argument for the Abandonment of the Allen Charge in California, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 939, 946 (1975).
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urity. We are convinced that the evils far outweigh the benefits,
and decree that its use shall no longer be tolerated and approved by this court. 59
A Misstatement

of the

Law

The above arguments could truly be utilized to mount a devastating
attack against Allen and its progeny. In a sense they may demonstrate
that Allen created far more difficult problems than it solved. Nevertheless, these arguments are only collateral to the three major attacks which
have been made against the supplemental instruction: First, that the instruction does not correctly state the law. Second, that the charge unduly
coerces the minority of jurors. And, third, the instruction as given IS
unconstitutional.
In Redeford v. State 60 the trial judge instructed the jury as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you are now into your second day of deliberation. I don't have to tell you that, you're
well aware of it. You've heard all the evidence in this case for
approximately two and half [sic] to three days. Really, there is
nothing decided unless the jury comes in with a verdict. You're an
intelligent jury, and if this case had to be tried over because of
your failure to reach a verdict, another jury of twelve people no
more intelligent would hear the same evidence and attempt to
reach a verdict. So you don't accomplish anything by not reaching a
verdict in this case. So would you continue your deliberations,
please, and put your collective minds together, and reach a verdict in
this case. 61
While perhaps cruder in tone than most, this sort of statement has for
decades been attached to the usual Allen instruction. 62 In essence, the
jury is instructed, either explicitly or implicitly, that "the case must at
some time be decided." 63 And such a direction is wrong. The court in
·Gainer properly stated that-aside from the coercive impact of such a
statement 64 -"such statements are legally inaccurate. It is simply not
true that a criminal case 'must at some time be decided.' " 65 The re-

59. State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161, 166, 342 P.2d 197, 200 (1959). See also
note 132 and accompanying text, infra.
60. 572 P.2d 219 (1977).
61. /d. at 220 (emphasis in original). The Nevada Supreme Court reversed
the conviction, finding that such an instruction might have forced the jury to
reach a compromise verdict.
62. See generally State v. Martin, 297 Minn. 359, 211 N.W.2d 765 (1973);
Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955
(1962).
63. People v. Gainer, 19 Cal.3d at 851, 566 P.2d at 1006, 139 Cal. Rptr. at
870.
64. See discussion in text accompanying notes 70-83 infra.
65. 19 Cal.3d at 852, 566 P.2d at 1006, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 870.

624

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

quirement of a verdict has never been a part of the law, 66 and for good
reason. As the Third Circuit so aptly showed, in a jury trial there always
have been and will continue to be three possible decisions of the jury:
not guilty, guilty, and no verdict due to lack of unanimity. 67 All three
options are open to the jury, and it is not in the province of the judge to
indicate that either of two of these options is better or more accurate
than the third. 68 Judge Brown stated the principle behind this rule effectively:
I think a mistrial from a hung jury is a safeguard to liberty.
In many areas it is the sole means by which one or a few may
stand out against an overwhelming contemporary public sentiment. Nothing should interfere with its exercise. In the final
analysis the Allen charge itself does not make sense. All it may
rightfully say is that there is a duty to consider the views of
others but that a conscientious person has finally the right and
duty to stand by conscience. If it says that and nothing more it
is a superfluous lecture in citizenship. If it says more to declare
that there is a duty to decide, it is legally incorrect as an interference with that rightful independence.
The time has come, I think, to forbid this practice. Like the
silver platter, this is too dear to keep. The cost in fundamental
fairness is too great. 69
Because the inclusion of the "this case must be decided" language is erroneous and may well be weighed heavily by the jury, the Gainer court
was clearly correct in striking down this portion of the instruction.
Coercion of the Minority Jurors

Suppose we do not have to be concerned with collateral matters such
as timing, or a charge directed too clearly to a known, small minority of
jurors, and so forth. Suppose also that the judge has not told the jury
that the case must at some time be decided. Suppose, therefore, we have

66. State v. Martin, 297 Minn. 359, 365, 211 N.W.2d 765, 769 (1973). See also
Comment, An Argument for the Abandonment of the Allen Charge in California, 15
SANTA CLARA LAW. 939, 948 (1975).
67. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 416 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396
u.s. 837 (1969).
68. See Comment, The Allen Charge Dilemma, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 637, 652,
663 (1972).
69. Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962). In their classic study of the jury system,
Kalven and Zeisel stated much the same rationale:
The hung jury is, in a way, the jury system's most interesting
phenomenon. In one sense it marks a failure of the system, since it
necessarily brings a declaration of mistrial in its wake. In another
sense, it is a valued assurance of integrity, since it can serve to protect
the dissent of a minority.
H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN juRY 453 (1966).
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the original Allen instruction. Is this instruction invalid? Yes, said the
court in Gainer, for aside from all else it unfairly coerces the minority of
jurors to reach a verdict in accordance with the majority. The Court
raised two primary objections to the instruction that
a dissenting juror should consider whether a doubt in his or
her own mind is a reasonable one, which makes no impression
on the minds of so many men or women equally honest, equally
intelligent with himself or herself. ... 70
The first objection is that with the instruction the jurors are told not
to be concerned, exclusively, with the evidence presented against the accused. Instead, they must also consider the nature of the deliberations in
determining guilt or innocence.
The one or more "holdout" jurors are told that in reaching
their independent conclusions as to whether or not a reasonable
doubt of the defendant's guilt exists, they are to weigh not only
the arguments and evidence but also their own status as
dissenters-a consideration both rationally and legally irrelevant to the issue of guilt. They are thus deflected from their
proper role as triers of fact, as effectively as if they had been
instructed to consider their doubts as to guilt in light of their
own prejudices or desire to go home. 71
Wholly apart from the constitutional claims which can be raised in connection with such a procedure, 72 the inclusion of such thinking on the
juror's part is error. In essence, the minority jurors-whichever way the
jurors are voting- 73 are instructed to assume that they are wrong, that
the majority jurors are right, and that they should reconsider their views
accordingly. 74 When the instruction is broken down in this fashion, the
direction to the jury approaches a shocking change of the basic jury
function in our system. To prevail, the state must, beyond a reasonable
70. People v. Gainer, 19 Cal.3d at 848, 566 P.2d at 1004, 139 Cal. Rptr. at
868.
71. Id.
72. See discussion at text accompanying notes 85-104 infra.
73. As the Gainer court forcefully wrote, the error is not eliminated if the
majority is preliminarily voting for acquittal:
Nor need we speculate that in the majority of cases the giving of an
Allen instruction will aid the prosecution rather than the defense: an
even distribution of risk between prosecution and defense over a multitude of cases is not the measure of justice. Our jury system aspires to
produce fair and accurate factual determinations in each case. An improper instruction should not be tolereated simply because statistically
it may help defendants as much as prosecutors. Whichever adversary it
favors, in urging minority jurors to reconsider their votes the Allen
charge places excessive and illegitimate pressures on the deliberating
jury. For this reason the giving of the charge is error.
19 Cal. 3d at 851, 566 P.2d at 1006, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
74. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 416 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396
u.s. 837 (1969).
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doubt, prove guilt to the satisfaction of each individual juror on the evidence and the evidence alone. 75 With this instruction, that requirement
is substantially defeated.
The second objection is no less serious. The Gainer court noted that
regardless of the extraneous evidence to be considered the trial court
was simply exerting overwhelming and unfair pressure on the dissenting
jurors.
The dissenters, struggling to maintain their position in a protracted debate in the jury room, are led into the courtroom
and, before their peers, specifically requested by the judge to
reconsider their position. No similar request is made of the
majority. It matters little that the judge does not know the identity of the particular dissenters; their fellow jurors know, and
the danger immediately arises that "the Allen charge can compound the inevitable pressure to agree felt by minority jurors."
The charge "'places the sanction of the court behind the views
of the majority, whatever they may be, and tempts the minority
juror to relinquish his position simply because he has been the
subject of a particular instruction."' 76
There can be little question that the instruction works, the dissenters are
quickly disposed to change their votes and to join the majority. 77 Justice
Udall set out the inevitable view almost thirty years ago:
The majority think he is guilty; the Court thinks I ought to
agree with the majority so the Court must think he is guilty.
While the Court did tell me not to surrender my conscientious
convictions, he told me to doubt seriously the correctness of my
own judgment. The Court was talking directly to me, since I
am the one who is keeping everyone from going home. So I
will just have to change my vote. 78
Few persons would challenge the contention that the Allen charge
greatly influences the minority jurors. Hence, it has been suggested that
the way to eliminate the problem is to influence both the minority -and

75. See People v. Superior Court, 67 Cal.2d 929, 434 P.2d 623, 64 Cal. Rptr.
327 (1967).
76. People v. Gainer, 19 Cal.3d at 850, 566 P.2d at 1005, 139 Cal. Rptr. at
869 (citations omitted).
77. /d.; State v. Martin, 297 Minn. 359, 211 N.W.2d 765 (1973); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 15, at 147; Comment, An Argument For the Abandonment of the
Allen Charge in California, 15 SANTA CLARA LAw. 939, 943 (1975); Comment, The
Allen Charge: Dead Law a Long Time Dying, 6 U.S.F. L. REv. 326, 329 (1972);
Comment, Deadlocked juries and Dynamite: A Critical Look at the Allen Charge, 31 U.
CHI. L. REv. 386, 389-90 (1964). For a general discussion of the impact of instructions on juries and the manner in which jurors decide cases, as seen in the
experimental jury project at the law school of the University of Chicago, see
James, Status and Competence of jurors, 64 AM. J. Soc. 563 (1959).
78. State v. Voeckall, 69 Ariz. 145, 157, 210 P.2d 972, 980 (1949) (dissenting
opinion). See also State v. Randall, 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054 (1960).
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the majority jurors. 79 Such a suggestion has not been broadly adopted
and for good reason. As the court in Gainer showed, any reference to a
majority or minority faction on the jury is irrelevant to the issue of guilt,
so on that ground alone it would be erroneous. 80 It would also be
ludicrous as shown by the Third Circuit in United States v. Fioravanti. 81
To avoid the coercion of the minority the instruction would have to be
the bizarre sort of charge the court imagined in Fioravanti.
A Juror should listen with deference to his fellow jurors and
with distrust of his own judgment if he finds that a large majority of jurors take a different view from that which he or she
takes. Similarly, in such circumstances, one in the majority
should distrust his own judgment if he finds a minority of
jurors taking a different view from that which he or she takes. 82
Such an instruction no doubt merely advises all sides in the jury to be
good citizens, behave themselves and listen to others. If it does only that
it is of no value at all. If it does more than that (i.e. if it succeeds in
instructing both the majority and the minority to listen to each other and
to distrust their own judgment because both sides are probably wrong!) it
"would be an invitation to a frolic with Alice in Wonderland." 83
Constitutional Arguments

Despite the problems with the Allen charge and the many rejections of
it, 84 most courts in turning away from Allen have done so on other than
constitutional grounds. In some cases the courts merely say such an instruction was error and give no ground for the decision. 85 In other
cases, such as Gainer, the court expressly refuses to use constitutional
arguments and instead decides that Allen should be rejected "as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure." 86 Lest there by any doubt,
however, strong constitutional arguments against Allen can be and have
been marshalled.
Basically, the constitutional arguments center around the due process
requirements inherent in any criminal trial and the way in which Allen
abridges those requirements. The threshold point to be made here is
that the due process clause-either by itself or with support of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and right to trial-requires that a trial be
conducted fairly.
79. See State v. Martin, 297 Minn. 359, 365, 211 N.W. 2d 765, 769 (1973).
80. People v. Gainer, 19 Cal.3d 835, 850 n.12, 566 P.2d 997, 1005 n.12, 139
Cal Rptr. 861, 869 n.12.
81. 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969).
82. Jd. at 417.
83. Jd.
84. See note I 05 infra.
85. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 297 Minn. 359, 2ll N.W.2d 765 (1973).
86. 19 Cal.3d at 852, 566 P.2d at 1006, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
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In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally
accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, "indifferent" jurors.
The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even
the minimal standards of due process. 87
As Mr. Justice Black stated so succinctly, "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is
a basic requirement of due process." 88 The arguments that the Allen
charge violates due process boil down to four contentions: (1) it defeats
the unanimity rule, (2) it does violence to the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard, (3) the jury does not remain impartial, and (4) the jury
is instructed to consider matters extraneous to the guilt or innocence of
the accused in addition to the evidence offered at trial in making its
determination.
1. The Unanimity Requirement

The federal courts, and most state courts, require that a jury verdict
be unanimous. 89 And this requirement has been deemed essential to
the fair trial proceeding.
The requirement of a unanimous jury verdict for criminal
cases in the federal courts and in all but a handful of states is
eloquent testimonial that something more than a majority vote
is desired. In this respect the jury system is unique. No other
deliberative body in the world requires unanimity-be it the
Congress of the United States, the College of Cardinals, the
Boards of Directors of our great corporations, this court of appeals, or the United States Supreme Court. The proponents of
the jury system maintain that a greater degree of accuracy is
guaranteed from this process of give and take which is invariably essential to reaching unanimity. 90
When the jurors, particularly dissenting jurors, are required to rethink
their position, some real. question is raised as to whether the effective
Allen charge somehow dilutes the unanimity requirement. Because it discourages jurors from freely holding their views the ultimate verqict may
not truly be unanimous; dissenters may join the m~ority to avoid the
wrath of the trial judge. The Third Circuit in United States v. Fioravanti
stated the concern quite well:
The jury persists as the finder of fact because it is designed
to be a deliberative body, charged with the responsibility of exchanging ideas, and with the concomitant practices of arguing
87. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
88. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955). The Court expressed the
same view in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966): "Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside
influences."
89. See generally United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 417-18 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969).
90. Id. at 418.
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and influencing. A judicial barrier should not be erected in the
jury room to discourage free and open discussion.
If the validity of the unanimous jury verdict requirement is
to persevere, appropriate respect must be extended and due
protection afforded to the incidence of group interaction for
this is the only justification for a verdict requiring a quantum of
agreement in excess of a simple majority. 91
2. Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard

Related to the unanimity requirement is the standard of proof in criminal cases: the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
The unanimity of a verdict in a criminal case is inextricably
interwoven with the required measure of proof. To sustain the
validity of a verdict by less than all of the jurors is to destroy
this test of proof for there cannot be a verdict supported by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt if one or more jurors remain
reasonably in doubt as to guilt. 92
One must question whether the standard has been met in the Allen
context. The jury reports a fairly clear deadlock of, say, nine to three
after deliberating three days. The Allen instruction is given; after two
hours of deliberation a unanimous verdict of guilty is reported back.
Could anyone in this situation-a not uncommon one-say with any
degree of certainty that somehow in that two-hour period each and
every juror became convinced of the guilt of the defendant, and convinced beyond a reasonable doubt? It strains credibility to believe that
such a miraculous transformation has taken place in such a short time.
The more likely explanation is that the dissenters were worn out and felt
an obligation to reach a verdict in light of the trial judge's comments.
This hardly constitutes unanimity in reaching a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.
We are convinced that the traditional measure of proof in
criminal cases envisions a "subjective standard"-viz, each individual juror must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. To maintain that an objective standard
governs could nullify the constitutionally mandated requirement of unanimity of verdict. Under any standard other than
an individual juror's determination, would not "the doubt of a

91. Id. at 417.
92. Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834, 838 (6th Cir. 1953). See also Billed v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1950):
An accused is presumed to be innocent. Guilt must be established
beyond a reasonable doubt. All twelve jurors must be convinced
beyond that doubt; if only one of them fixedly has a reasonable doubt,
a verdict of guilty cannot be returned.
See generally United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 418-19 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969).
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single juror in the face of seven votes for conviction [be] * * *
per se unreasonable?"
Where a verdict of guilty is generated by the process of being
influenced by a preliminary vote of the majority instead of subjective convincement beyond a reasonable doubt, at best we
have a situation where two separate portions of the charge are
at loggerheads; at worst, we have a serious question that the
charge may have become constitutionally delinquent, in derogation of the defendant's tranditional right of trial by jury. 03
3. An Impartial jury
Due process requires that the defendant's trial be heard by an impartial jury. 94 Can the jury truly remain impartial when it is directed by
the court to reconsider the entire matter because some minority jurors
cannot side with the majority? That, truly, is the question. The answer is
no. Such direction by the judge does indeed bias the jury to return a
verdict. Those jurors are no longer impartial. Judge Coleman explained
the situation with great clarity in his oft-cited opinion in Thaggard v.
United States. 95
There is no intention of criticizing the District Judge for
using this instruction. It is being done all the time, and it seems
to the writer from considerable trial experience that the practice is growing instead of diminishing. It likewise seems from
practical experience that after a jury has retired to consider its
verdict, has done so for some time, and has indicated that it is
in hopeless deadlock, every juror, not being trained in the law,
understands from the Allen charge that what the Judge wants
93. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d at 419. See also State v. Martin, 297
Minn. 359, 365-66, 211 N'.W.2d 765, 769 (1973):
[B]y admonishing that absolute certainty cannot be attained or expected, the Allen Charge tends to erode the universal rule requiring
guilt to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
One commentator stated the objection quite well.
The imposition of outside evidence also plays havoc with the concept
of "reasonable doubt." If unanimity is to have any meaning beyond the
theoretical, each juror must be convinced of an accused's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. Tentative opinions or balance of the jury members
should play no role in a dissenting juror's change of position. There is
no connection between the majority view and the reasonableness of an
individual juror's doubt. Yet, the charge may have the effect of lowering the standard of proof from the necessary concurring views of 12
individuals to what the majority considers sufficient. The state would
then not have proved its case beyond the reasonable doubt and the
defendant would be denied a fair trial.
Comment, The Allen Charge: Dead Law a Long Time Dying, 6 U.S.F. L. REV. 326,
334 (1972).
94. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966).
95. 354 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966).
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is a verdict. So, there the previously reluctant juror stands, fancying himself in opposition to the wishes of a United States
Judge, which is about the last position in which he ever wanted
to find himself. He is only exercising everyday human nature
when he gets out of that unhappy predicament just as quickly
as he can.
The real burden of what I am saying is that the essential
meaning of Constitutionally guaranteed trial by jury is that
once the jury has retired to consider of its verdict it should not
be subjected to so much as the appearance of any influence
from any source for the purpose of producing a verdict. The
jurors should be left to the unhampered expression of their
own consciences, independently arrived at. 96
If the judge who gives the Allen charge gives the indication that he might
be exerting undue pressure on members of the jury, at least the strong
appearance of partiality has been created. Such a situation violates the
right to a fair trial by jury.
4. Factors Extraneous to the Issue

of Guilt

Perhaps the strongest constitutional argument to be offered against
the Allen charge, and one relied on heavily by the Gainer court, is that
the instruction directs the jurors to consider factors extraneous and irrelevant to the issue of guilt, and in addition to the items of evidence
which were properly admitted at trial.
Yet in instructing that "a dissenting juror should consider
whether a doubt in his or her own mind is a reasonable one,
which makes no impression on the minds of so many men or
women equally honest, equally intelligent. with himself or herself," the trial judge pointedly directs the jurors to include an
extraneous factor in their deliberations, i.e., the position of the majority
of jurors at the moment. The one or more "holdout" jurors are
told that in reaching their independent conclusions as to
whether or not a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt
exists, they are to weigh not only the arguments and evidence
but also their own status as dissenters-a consideration both rationally and legally irrelevant to the issue of guilt. They are thus deflected from their proper role as triers offact, as effectively as if they
had been instructed to consider their doubts as to guilt in light
of their own prejudices or desire to go home. 97
Without question the California court's analysis is correct. Indeed, that
result is precisely the point of the supplemental instruction. The judge
wants the dissenting jurors to reconsider their views in light of the fact
that most of the other jurors do not share such a view. The hope, of
96. /d. at 741.
97. 19 Cal.3d at 848, 566 P.2d at 1004, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 868 (emphasis
added).
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course, is that the dissenting view will be shifted so that the majority
verdict will soon become the unanimous verdict.
This result cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. Time and time
again the Supreme Court has said that the jury "verdict must be based
upon the evidence developed at the trial." 98 "The requirement that a
jury's verdict 'must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial'
goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury." 99 Quite clearly the Allen instruction does
not comport with either the letter or the spirit of this principle. The jury
is instructed in no uncertain terms to consider not only the evidence but
the manner in which the deliberations are taking place and the status of
minority jurors vis-a-vis majority jurors. Such a practice is unconstitutionaJ.l00
The constitutional arguments against Allen can be substantial, yet most
courts generally avoid constitutional determinations in this area. Some
courts raise the constitutional issue, but then decide the cases on other
grounds. 101 Other courts discuss the substantive problems but do not
identify them as constitutional questions. 102 Perhaps the courts are
loathe to consider the constitutional grounds when the Supreme Court,
despite numerous opportunities, has chosen not to invalidate Allen. 103
More likely, courts act this way so as to follow the general rule that cases
ought to be decided on non-constitutional grounds if at all possible. 104
Whatever the reason, despite the few constitutional holdings, courts and
attorneys should not ignore the fact that substantial constitutional questions arise whenever the supplemental instruction is given.

98. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
99. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1964). The Court went further:
In the constitutional sense, trial by jury in a criminal case necessarily
implies at the very least that the "evidence developed" against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where
there is full judicial protection of the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel.
/d. at 472-73.
100. For a good discussion on this point see Comment, Due Process, judicial
Economy and the Hung jury: A Re-examination of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REV.
123 (1967).
101. See, e.g., People v. Gainer, 19 Cal.3d 835, 566 P.2d 997, 139 Cal. Rptr.
861 (1977); United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837
(1969). See generally ABA STANDARDS, supra note 15, at 149.
102. See People v. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d 835, 566 P.2d 997, 139 Cal. Rptr. 861
(1977).
I 03. A very real possibility; see text accompanying notes 124-131 infra.
104. Cf United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837
(1969).
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THE ALLEN SuPPORTERS

Most courts considering a substantive appeal of the issue appear skeptical as to the continued validity of Allen and either refuse to follow it or
limit it considerably. 105 The Fifth Circuit was frank in its evaluation:
"The Allen charge both deserves and receives a healthy disrespect in our
courts." 106 The courts recognize the logical and practical problems with
Allen and do not wish to invite reversal by its continued use. As the
Louisiana Supreme Court remarked, 'jurisprudential and scholarly disapproval appears to approach universality." 107 While there is a definite
trend to eliminate or cut back on Allen 108 many states and .federal jurisdictions 109 still retain both the traditional Allen charge as well as the embellished supplemental instructions.11°
In light of the intense criticism, one might legitimately ask why the
instruction remains viable in so many jurisdictions.U 1 If Allen is dying,
why after so many years is there still a pulse? Four answers can be given
to this puzzling question. First, in many states few substantive cases ever
seem to reach the higher appellate courts. For instance, in states the size
of Texas and New York, very rarely have appellate judges been specifically directed to consider the validity of the Allen charge.11 2 Another
answer to the question is that in many jurisdictions when the Allen question has arisen the court's attention was focused on collateral matters
which disposed of the case. See, for example, United States v. Seawell 113
105. For a comprehensive list of these cases see Comment, The Allen Charge:
The Propriety of Giving Supplemental Instructions to a Deadlocked Jury, 22 LoY. L.
REv. 667, 673-75 (1976). See also Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 1154; Annot., 100
A.L.R.2d 177.
106. United States v. Amaya, 509 F.2d 8, 12 (5th Cir.' 1975), aff'd after new
trial, 533 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1101 (1977). Nevertheless, the Allen charge is still good law in the Fifth Circuit.
107. State v. Nicholson, 315 So. 2d 639, 643 (La. 1975).
108. "It is clear, however, that the 'dynamite charge' is being defused." Comment, The Allen Charge: Recurring Problems and Recent Developments, 47 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 296, 319 (1972); Comment, On Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 78 YALE L.J.
100, 103 (1968) ("Hostility to the Allen charge has been growing for some
.
, ).
time....
.
109. Indeed, the dissenter in Nicholson noted that Allen was still the "overwhelming weight of authority in the United States." 315 So.2d at 646.
110. See generally People v. Gainer; 19 Cal. 3d 835, 566 P.2d 997, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 861 (1977).
111. To be sure, the basic Allen instruction was given as a part of the manual
on jury instructions in federal criminal cases, 33 F.R.D. 523, 611 (1963), from
1963 until 1969. See discussion in United States v. Silvern, 484 F.2d 879 (7th
Cir. 1973). See also Devitt and Blackmar, 1 FEDERAL JuRY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 18.14 (1977).
112. See, e.g., Arrevalo v. Texas, 489 S.W.2d 569 (1973); People v. Abdul
Karim Al-Kanani, 33 N.Y.2d 260, 307 N.E.2d 43, 351 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1973), cert.
denied, .417 U.S. 916 (1974).
113. 550 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d
374 (lOth Cir. 1975).
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where the Ninth Circuit had its attention directed to the repeating of the
supplemental instruction rather than to the propriety of any particular
supplemental instruction.
The most obvious (and perhaps most important) reason some courts
have not rejected Allen is that these courts simply do not agree with the
prevailing criticism. As the dissenting justice remarked in the Gainer
case, "The 'Allen instruction' is an 'appropriate action to encourage
agreement.'" 114 As another judge pointed out, "The importance of having a jury agree may properly be urged upon their attention .... They
may properly be warned against stubbornness and self-assertion.'' 115 The
most direct attack on the criticism of Allen was made by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Sawyers. 116 Recognizing the "increasing criticism
of Allen type charges," 117 the court dealt with the attacks in some detail. The court specifically stated that the assertion "that anyone has the
right to hang a jury rather than the right to a true verdict is erroneous." 118 The court remarked that the key determination was whether
the jury had been coerced into reaching a verdict. If the jury has not
been coerced, the defendant cannot complain.
When a defendant occasionally benefits, if he does, from a
hung jury, he is getting not what he is entitled to have but
something less. Beneath the criticism of verdict inducing instructions is the apparent assumption that such an instruction is
always detrimental to defendants. We are unaware of any statistical survey proving or disproving such an assumption. We do
know, however, that not infrequently verdicts of acquittal follow
Allen type instructions. So far as we know, there is no reason to
suppose that an Allen type instruction is more likely to induce a
verdict of guilty than of not guilty. Indeed, the trial judge may
not inquire as to how the jury stands, and thus may not knowingly press for a verdict either way except in the rare instance
when the jurors disclose to him, without inquiry, their division.119
Similar remarks were made by Judge Pell, dissenting from the Seventh
Circuit's adoption of a set rule regarding supplemental instructions.J2°
In addition, though, he contended that appeals judges should not affirmatively direct the giving of jury instructions. They should, perhaps,

114.-19 Cal.3d at 859, 566 P.2d at 1011, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 875. See also People
v. Carter, 68 Cal.2d 810, 815, 442 P.2d 353, 356, 69 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (1968).
115. People v. Randall, 9 N.Y.2d 413,425, 174 N.E.2d 507, 515, 214 N.Y.S.2d
417, 427 (1961). See also United States v. Sutherland, 463 F.2d 641 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1078 (1972).
116. 423 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1970).
117. Id. at 1340.
118. Id. at 1341.
119. Id.
120. United States v. Silvern, 484 F.2d 879, 884 (7th Cir. 1973).
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impose guidelines, but they should not set out the instructions which
would or would not be suitable.
My basic feeling is that the matter of writing instructions
should remain in the hands of the trial judges. They are the
ones at the battle site who are best in the position to judge
which instructions are appropriate to the factual issues.
Likewise they are best in the position to determine the nature,
necessity, and verbiage of instructions to be given in connection
with the functional aspects of jury deliberation, including those
that may be necessary when it reasonably appears that a jury
has reached the status of being deadlocked. If in any instruction the court misstates the law and the effect is prejudicial
then, of course, a reversal would ordinarily follow. By prescribing the exact language in which a trial judge may instruct in the
deadlocked situation we are, it seems to me, substantially circumscribing the discretionary flexibility needed by the trial
judge for effective trial administration. It is one thing to find
no error in an instruction which has been given in a trial,
thereby putting out tacit approval on it, and an entirely different matter to engage in a priori processes of word fixation. 121
A final reason should be given as to why some federal courts are reluctant to cast aside Allen even when there is substantial skepticism as to
the validity of the instruction. The Supreme Court has only once addressed the issue of the Allen instruction, in Allen, and it expressly upheld
the constitutionality of the instruction. Then Judge John Paul Stevens,
sitting on the Seventh Circuit, expressed the obvious concern quite
clearly.
I have not yet been able satisfactorily to explain to myself
how this circuit can lawfully announce that an instruction to a
jury which the Supreme Court has specifically and squarely
held is not reversible error in federal criminal trials shall in the
future constitute reversible error when given in such trials conducted in the Seventh Circuit. 122
Although a few responses have been given to this concern, they may
not be, as Justice Stevens wrote, "completely satisfactory." 123 First, it is
argued that the Court last considered Allen in the 19th century when
concerns over criminal defendants' rights were minimal. 124 While this

121. Id.
122. Id. at 886.
123. Id. See also United States v. Skillman, 442 F.2d 542 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 u.s. 833 (1971).
124. I realize that as long as Allen ... stands it is our duty to follow it. I
entertain the thought that if it were submitted to the Supreme
Court today the result might not be the same as it was in 1896. I
cannot see that the qualifications, reservations, and escape clauses
customarily used in modern versions of the charge save it from
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fact is no doubt true, it is not at all clear that the Court would indeed
hold to the contrary today. It has had the opportunity to do so in
numerous cases in which review has been denied by the Court. It has
also chosen not to consider the issue when it was raised in cases disposed
of on other grounds by the Court. 125 A related response is that aside
from the binding effect of the earlier Allen decision, any charge which
today coerces a jury verdict denies due process; usually jenkins v. United
States 126 is cited for this proposition. It is true that the Court there held
that a particular supplemental instruction was unduly coercive. The
problem is that the Court specifically noted that it was coercive "in its
context and under all the circumstances," 127 and that the circumstances
were especially egregious. After only two hours of deliberation the jury
informed the judge that it could not reach a verdict "on both counts
because of insufficient evidence." Instead of simply giving a supplemental instruction of the standard form, 128 the trial judge told the jury,
"You have got to reach a decision in this case." 129 This is hardly a clear
precedent for the broad due process claims in opposition to Allen.
Perhaps the best reason why the lower federal courts should be able to
reject Allen-in spite of the Supreme Court's refusal to overrule it-is
the most deceptively simple one. The Court held that it was not unconstitutional to give the Allen instruction. It did not say it was a required
instruction, or that alternative instructions were not also valid. Thus,
without reaching the constitutional claims regarding Allen, 130 courts
should be able to use their own supervisory power to say that other
methods of dealing with the problem of the deadlocked juries are preferable. Of course, even this limited rationale is troublesome when the
courts (as the Seventh Circuit) declare that continued use of Allen will

being what it is, and what the jury believes it to be, a direct appeal
from the Bench for a verdict.
Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 739-40 (5th Cir. 1965) (Coleman, J.,
specially concurring), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 985 (1966).
125. See, e.g., Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952), where the Court
held that numerous errors "are either insubstantial or so adequately disposed of
by the court of appeals that we give them no notice .... "Id. at 744. At the court
of appeals level, 190 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1951), a challenge to Allen was raised on
broad grounds and was rejected. The Allen problem was again raised in appellant's brief before the Supreme Court, Opening Brief on Behalf of Appellant at
160-69. See Comment, The Allen Charge Dilemma, 10 AM. CRlM. L. REv. 637, 664
n.I09 (1972).
126. 380 U.S. 445 (1965). See discussion in Comment, The Allen Charge: The
Propriety of Giving Supplemental Instructions to a Deadlocked jury, 22 LoY. L. REV.
667, 669 (1976).
127. 380 U.S. at 446.
128. Or declaring a mistrial because of the jury's reference to "insufficient
evidence."
129. 380 U.S. at 446.
130. None of the federal courts do, at least not in their holdings.
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constitute reversible error. Still, the continued emphasis here should be
on the discretionary powers of the courts rather than on any formal
constitutional determinations by those courts. 131
SoLUTIONS To THE PROBLEM

The theoretical and logical objections to Allen are substantial. The
major practical objection, though, would seem to be that the giving of
the Allen instruction as written wastes the time of so many appellate
judges (albeit saving the time of some trial judges}. 132 Thus, one is
131. The question of being bound by stare decisis regarding the Allen rule is
present even with circuit decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d
652, 669 (5th Cir. 1972) (citations omitted):
We deeply regret being compelled to affirm this conviction. We do so
only because we are bound by precedent. Were the choice ours alone
to make, we would put an end to the Allen charge in a "quick and not
too decent burial." It is our fervent hope that when appellant petitions
this court for rehearing en bane our learned and distinguished brethren will vote for en bane consideration. We would also hope that this
court will join the jurisdictions that have abolished this abuseable relic.
But whatever the outcome of such a hearing, the law cannot help but
be vastly improved by our issuing a definitive statement regarding the
further use of the dynamite charge. ·
The court, en bane, reaffirmed its support for Allen. United States v. Bailey, 480
F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1973).
132. In the 5th Circuit, where an Allen charge is not improper- United States
v. Thomas, 567 F.2d 638, 643 (5th Cir. 1978)-the courts have recently been
swamped with literally dozens of Allen instruction questions in both civil and
criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Solomon, 565 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Skinner,
535 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1976), eert. denied, 429 U.S. 1048 (1977); United States v.
Taylor, 530 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1976); Government of the Canal Zone v. Fears,
528 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Cheramie, 520 F.2d 325 (5th Cir.
1975); Brooks v. Bay State Abrasive Products, Inc., 516 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976); United States v. Howell, 514 F.2d 710
(5th Cir.), eert. denied, 423 U.S. 914 (1975); Bryan v. Wainwright, 511 F.2d 644
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975); United States v. Amaya, 509 F.2d 8
(5th Cir. 1975), aff'd after new trial, 533 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1976), eert. denied, 429
U.S. 1101 (1977); United States v. Fonseca, 490 F.2d 464 (5th Cir.), eert. denied,
419 U.S. 1072 (1974); United States v. Thaxton, 483 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Bailey, 480 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bailey, 468
F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Sutherland, 463 F.2d 641 (5th Cir.),
eert. denied, 409 U.S. 1078 (1972); United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 894 (5th
Cir. 1971); Hale v. United States, 435 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1970), eert. denied, 402
U.S. 976 (1971); Nordmann v. National Hotel Company, 425 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir.
1970); Downs v. American Employers Insurance Company, 423 F.2d 1160 (5th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Hill, 417 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1969); Posey v. United
States, 416 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1969), eert. denied, 397 U.S. 946 (1970); Pennington
v. United States, 392 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971);
Williamson v. United States, 365 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966); Cunningham v. United
States, 356 F.2d 454 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 952 (1966); Thaggard v.
United States, 354 F.2d 735 (5th Cir.), eert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966); North
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drawn to the difficult question: Is there a solution to this dilemma? The
obvious solution, of course, is simply to avoid using Allen and not give
any supplemental instruction at all to the jury. 133 Few persons have
seriously suggested this solution for an all-too-clear reason. When the
jury is deadlocked some guidance is needed to assist them in reaching a
verdict if reasonably possible. The Illinois Supreme Court expressed the
view nicely: "[W]e do not feel that a jury should be left to grope in such
circumstances without some guidance from the court." 134
Other suggestions have also been made. One commentator thought
that incorporating the Allen charge into the initial voir dire would enable
selection of jurors to "be based on a potential juror's capacity to withstand the intimidation inherent in the Allen charge." 135 The problem
with any such proposal, as recognized even by the commentator suggesting it, is that it is somewhat naive. "[A] real possibility exists that during
voir dire a juror will establish his capacity to resist the coercion of an
Allen charge and later accede to majority rule under the pressures of
the instruction." 136 Moreover, the type of juror who could completely
say that he would definitely not be influenced by the majority's position
on a matter may not be the open-minded sort of juror either the prosecution or defense would want.
While other suggestions have been made for eliminating the supplemental instructions and using other devices to assist the deadlocked
jury,137 few of these suggestions are taken very seriously. Most judges
and commentators would prefer to utilize some sort of supplemental inTexas Producers Association v. Metzger Dairies, Inc., 348 F.2d 189 (5th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 977 (1966); Walker v. United States, 342 F.2d 22 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 859 (1965); Estes v. United States, 335 F.2d 609 (5th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965); Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852
(5th Cir. 1962); Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1962), cerl.
denied, 372 U.S. 946 (1963); Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962); Powell v. United States, 297 F.2d 318 (5th Cir.
1961); Sikes v. United States, 279 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1960); Silverman v. Travelers Insurance Company, 277 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1960); Wilson v. Southern Farm
Bureau Casualty Company, 275 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.), cerl. denied, 364 U.S. 817
(1960); Slade v. United States, 267 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1959); Harrell v. United
States, 220 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1955); Burton v. United States, 175 F.2d 960 (5th
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 909 (1950).
133. See Comment, Criminal Procedure-Jury Instructions-ADA Standard
Adopted for Instructing Deadlocked juries, 42 TENN. L. REv. 803, 814 (1975).
134. People v. Prim, 53 Ill.2d 62, 74, 289 N.E.2d 601, 608 (1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 918. See also United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1343 (4th Cir.
1970). But see People v. Sullivan, 392 Mich. 324, 220 N.W.2d 441 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
135. Comment, The Allen Charge: Recurring Problems and Recent Developments, 47
N.Y.U. L. REv. 296, 317 (1972).
136. Id. at 318.
137. For a creative group of suggestions, see Comment, Instructing Deadlociled
juries in Light of the Trial of Juan Corona, 53 ORE. L. REv. 213, 223-25 (1974).
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struction, while avoiding if possible the kinds of difficulties which Allen
creates. One alternative for toning down the harshness of Allen is to
allow the use.of the supplemental instruction only if it was given earlier
as part of the large block of jury instructions. 138 Another would be to
require, in addition to the Allen instruction, a re-reading to the deadlocked jury of the instructions regarding the presumption of innocence
and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 139

The ABA Approach
Most courts, faced with the prospect of dealing with deadlocked juries,
have not in recent years retained the Allen charge, nor have they
adopted the possible proposals discussed above. Instead, a single proposal formulated by a section of the American Bar Association has swept
the nation, resulting in strong praise by commentators. 140 More im portantly, it has been widely adopted (either as a requirement or a strong
suggestion to trial judges) by both federaJ1 41 and state courts. 142 In
1968 the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for
Criminal Justice reported its Standards Relating to Trial by Jury. Stan-

138. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 502 at 349 (1969). This is
the approach apparently taken by the Seventh Circuit. United States v. Silvern,
484 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1973).
139. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 502 at 349 (1969).
140. See, e.g., the following comments praising the ABA proposal: Cushioning
the Blow of the "Dynamite Charge," 6 MEMPHIS ST. .L. REv. 553 (1976); Comment,
An Argument for the Abandonment of the Allen Charge in California, 15 SANTA CLARA
LAw. 939 (1975); Criminal Procedure-Jury Instructions-A.B.A. Standard Adopted
for Instructing Deadlocked juries, 42 TENN. L. REV. 803 (1975); Comment, Instructing Deadlocked juries: The Present Status of the Allen Charge, 3 TEx. TECH. L. REv.
313 (1972); Comment, The Faltering Allen Charge and its Proposed Replacement, 16
ST. Loms L.J. 619 (1972); The Allen Charge Dilemma, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 637
(1972); The Allen Charge: Recurring Problems and Recent Developments, 47 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 296 (1972); The Allen Charge: Dead Law a Long Time Dying, 6 U.S.F. L. REv.
326 (1972).
141. For a very limited sample of the federal cases, see these recent cases:
United States v. Silvern, 484 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Flannery,
451 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir.
1971); United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969). The Committee on the Operation of the Jury System of the Judicial Conference of the
United States Courts has recommended that the ABA standards, with one addition, be supported. See discussion in United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335,
1342 n.7 (4th Cir. 1970).
142. For a small sample of the state cases, see People v. Gainer, 19 Cal.3d 835,
857, 566 P.2d 997, 1009, 139 Cal. Rptr. 861, 873; State v. Nicholson, 315 So. 2d
639 (La. 1975); People v. Sullivan, 392 Mich. 324, 220 N.W.2d 441 (1974); State
v. Martin, 297 Minn. 359, 211 N.W.2d 765 (1973); People v. Prim, 53 Ill. 2d 62,
289 N.E.2d 601 (1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 275 A.2d 299 (1971).
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dard 5.4 was designed specifically to deal with the Allen charge questions. The standard provides as follows:
(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give
an instruction which informs the jury:
(i) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must
agree thereto;
(ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another
and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to individual
judgment;
(iii) that each juror must decide the case for himself,
but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors;
(iv) that in the cours·e of deliberations, a juror should
not hesitate to reexamine his own views and change
his opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and
(v) that no juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely
because of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or for the
mere purpose of returning a verdict.
(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to
agree, the court may require the jury to continue their deliberations and may give or repeat an instruction as provided in subsection (a). The court shall not require or threaten to require
the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for
unreasonable intervals.
(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a
verdict if it appears that there is no reasonable probability of
agreement. 143
Why is the ABA standard superior to the usual supplemental instruction, at least in the minds of the many judges who have adopted it? First,
the instruction is given at the conclusion of the trial before any deliberations have been started by the jury. This is a great advantage, as the jury
143. In the comments to the standards the drafters also set forth an example
of an instruction which would be consistent with the standards:
The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror.
In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that each juror agree
thereto. Your verdict must be unanimous.
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without
violence to individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for
yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do
not hesitate to re-examine your own views and change your opinion if
convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction
as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of
your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
You are not partisans. You are judges-judges of the facts. Your
sole interest is to ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case.
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is advised at the start how to proceed if there is a split, and the rereading of the instruction later would not be nearly as coercive on the minority jurors as it is in the typical Allen situation. Reference should also be
made to the obvious fact that there is no mention at all in the standard
of majority-minority splits, the jurors are simply advised as to their obligations and rights as jurors. Also, rather than directing the jury to decide the case, the jury is instead told to consult with each other and to
reach agreement "if it can be done without violence to individual judgment." In short, by informing the jurors of these responsibilities and
rights, and by not telling them that the case must be decided, the judge
is simply stressing the importance of their endeavor, yet avoiding virtually all the problems created by Allen. It is an instruction which can be
given again when the jury is deadlocked. The jury is made to understand in no uncertain terms that it should try its hardest to reach a verdict. Thus, it may well work; as with Allen it may have the effect of
eliminating petty differences. Still, it does not coerce, it does not
threaten, it does not improperly state the law. It is a correct declaration
of legal principles, it may work effectively, and it does not unfairly push
the jury. As most judges to review it have realized, there is little more
that can be asked of any one instruction. 144
CONCLUSION

The California Supreme Court in the Gainer case was right: The Allen
charge is coercive, unfair to defendants, an inaccurate statement of the
law, and might well be unconstitutional if the Supreme Court ever
chooses to reconsider the matter. Nevertheless, deadlocked juries are a
fact of life which cannot be swept aside. Something is needed to assist
the deadlocked jury. The jurors may be at loose ends during deliberations, but often they could be persuaded in a legitimate fashion to reach
a verdict. What is needed is the instruction based upon the ABA standard. This standard will have the effect of aiding the jury in an
evenhanded and lawful way. In addition to the growing legion of courts
to adopt it, other courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
should take a fresh and favorable look at the ABA standard. The time
has come for the dynamite charge to be permanently defused.

144. For an excellent, and favorable, analysis of the ABA Standards, see State
v. Martin, 297 Minn. 359, 211 N.W.2d 765 (1973).

